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In Elena Chizhova’s The Time of Women (2009), a short novel set in the mid-
sixties, three elderly women help their young neighbor raise her daughter. 
The women secretly christen the girl and teach her about their Orthodox faith. 
When the girl’s mother, Antonina, becomes terminally ill, the following con-
versation takes place with one of the babushki, Glikeria:
Glikeria tries to comfort [Antonina]. “The Lord himself will sort everything 
out. In the other world things are quiet and peaceful. In the green pastures 
. . . You see everyone who you have said farewell to. What sins can you have 
. . . Let those tremble, whose path lies to hell.”
“I dream of living under communism, Glikeria Yegorovna. Just to have a 
glimpse of it . . . The people who will live to see it are happy.”
“Oh!”—she waves her hand.—“When will that happen? They promised 
it before the war . . .”
“Before the war they were just guessing . . . But they know now for 
 certain: in 20 years. They say that everything will be dif erent. Machines 
will do the laundry . . .”
Raised in the countryside, Antonina believes in various folk practices, but 
when dying of cancer, a secular, communist vision of the future seems to 
haunt her, albeit in a confused fashion. The exchange quoted above ends with 
Antonina calmly contemplating a future communist paradise full of kind and 
cheerful people like the ones shown on television. “That’s right,” she nods. 
“I think that’s what paradise is like. Just the way it is on television. I didn’t 
use to believe that. But now I think that this is what it is like. I dream of going 
there . . .”1
Chizhova’s discussions of God, the at erlife, and communism are, of 
course, i ctional, but such dialogues were indeed taking place in the mid-1960s 
and they leave their trace in the archival record. In these years, researchers 
were busy investigating, among other things: believers’ “conception of God” 
in Ivanovo region; their “view of the world” in Tambov; the “emotional inl u-
ence of religious ritual” in Rivne, Ukraine; and conceptions of social relations 
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in Pskov.2 In this article, I of er a close reading of fourteen interview tran-
scripts from a larger number produced as part of the i eldwork conducted in 
Ivanovo in 1964–65.3 The texts provide vivid insight into the religious imagi-
nation of Soviet citizens, many of whom were elderly working-class or peasant 
women, a cohort ot en awarded little attention in historical studies, although 
the demographic imbalances generated by the war made them a signii cant 
presence in late Soviet society.4
The interviews also provide insight into the atheist, or secularizing, goals 
of the party-state. As Catherine Wanner has recently argued, “Seculariza-
tion was an integral element to socialist modernity and state building in the 
USSR.” Although the post-Soviet years saw a religious boom, she argues, we 
should not see this simply in terms of the regime’s failure but rather explore 
the ways in which the promotion of atheism itself “fueled religious change.”5 
This i ts with Charles Taylor’s invitation to view secularization not simply in 
terms of what has been lost: “The rise of modernity isn’t just a story of loss, of 
subtraction.”6 Writing on the North Atlantic world, Taylor asserts, “The pat-
tern of modern religious life under ‘secularization’ is one of destabilization 
and recomposition, a process which can be repeated many times.”7 In the 
USSR, secularization was, of course, envisaged as only the i rst step: religion 
would i rst be driven out of public life; later it would disappear altogether. An 
urge to accelerate toward this future state of universal atheism—an impulse 
pursued with varying levels of ferocity in dif erent decades—made seculariza-
2. Rossiisskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial΄no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI), fond 
(f.) 606 (Akademiia nauk pri TsK KPSS), opis΄ (op.) 4 (Institut nauchnogo ateizma, 1964–
78), delo (d.) 133 (Materialy konkretno-sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia na temu “pred-
stavleniia sovremennogo veruiushchego o boge,” provedennogo Instituta nauchnogo 
ateizma v gorodakh i selakh Ivanovskoi oblasti, 1964–65); RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 134 
(Materialy konkretno-sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia na temu “predstavleniia sovre-
mennogo veruiushchego o boge,” provedennogo Instituta nauchnogo ateizma v gorodakh 
i selakh Ivanovskoi oblasti, 1964–66); RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 148 (Materialy konkretno-
 sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia “predstavleniia sovremennogo veruiushchego ob ot-
noshenii mezhdu liud΄mi,” Pskovskaia oblast ,́ 1964–65); RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 149 
(Materialy konkretno-sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia “predstavleniia sovremennogo 
veruiushchego ob otnoshenii mezhdu liud΄mi,” Pskovskoi oblasti v 1964–65); RGASPI, 
f. 606, op. 4, d. 156 (Materialy konkretno-sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia “predstavle-
niia veruiushchego o kartine mira,” Tambovskaia oblast΄ 1964–65); and RGASPI, f. 606, 
op. 4, d. 176 (Materialy konkretno-sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia “ob emotsial΄nom 
vozdeistvii religioznoi obriadnosti,” Rovenskaia oblast ,́ 1964).
3. I studied the results of four research projects archived in RGASPI and took full cop-
ies of twenty-four interviews.
4. Stephen Lovell, “Soviet Russia’s Older Generations,” in Stephen Lovell, ed., Gener-
ations in Twentieth-Century Europe (Basingstoke, 2007), 205–26. Irina Paperno’s study of 
Evgeniia Kiseleva’s autobiographical notebooks is a wonderful exception. Irina Paperno, 
Stories of the Soviet Experience: Memoirs, Diaries, Dreams (Ithaca, 2009), 118–58. On the 
demographic imbalance, see Tony Wood, “Russia Vanishes,” London Review of Books 34, 
no. 23 (December 6, 2012): 39–41, at www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n23/tony-wood/russia-vanishes 
(last accessed September 23, 2014).
5. Catherine Wanner, introduction to Catherine Wanner, ed., State Secularism and 
Lived Religion in Soviet Russia and Ukraine (Oxford, 2012), 1–2.
6. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass., 2007), 26.
7. Taylor, A Secular Age, 461.
The Social Scientist Meets the “Believer” 81
tion more militant, violent, and unpredictable than elsewhere and, as a result, 
the tendency toward “destabilization” and “recomposition” of religious life 
potentially more acute.
This article explores two key aspects of Soviet secularization. First, I ex-
amine believers’ heterodox conceptions of heaven and hell. Their departures 
from and reworkings of church teaching were in part the result of a “domes-
tication” of spiritual life that reduced knowledge of Christian doctrine.8 But 
they testify not only to a failure to reproduce church teaching but also to mo-
ments of individual creativity. They demonstrate the interconnectedness of 
the religious and the secular: the values and aesthetics embodied in the at er-
life were rooted in the experience of this life, with the language, aspirations, 
and frustrations of Soviet existence animating the religious imagination. 
Furthermore, it suggests that among the poor and socially excluded, visions 
of the at erlife sometimes articulated a desire for social equality considered 
missing from Soviet society.
Second, I probe the Soviet state’s problematic dependency on atheism. 
Religion, it has been argued, is essential to the construction of modernity: 
by dictating the place and nature of acceptable religious behavior, the mod-
ern state displays and reai  rms its own power and establishes a dichotomy 
between the rational and enlightened nature of secular governance and the 
dangers of untamed, uncontrolled religiosity.9 In the Soviet case, the asser-
tion of modernity—packaged as “progress”—was absolutely central to the 
regime’s claim to legitimacy and the binary with religion especially promi-
nent.10 But, paradoxically, the Soviet party-state needed believers, even as 
propagandists labored for their extinction. Take, for example, Nikita Khru-
shchev’s reported boast that one day soon the last priest would be paraded on 
Soviet television. Even in this much-anticipated moment of religion’s destruc-
tion, a believer was required in order to publicly display the dark past Soviet 
power had  ousted.11 In some cases, believers were presented as irrational and 
8. In her work on Georgia and Azerbaijan, Tamara Dragadze uses the term domes-
tication, arguing that because churches and mosques were closed, lay people took over 
key religious activities and some rituals were performed in the home. She does not see 
religiosity itself declining. Tamara Dragadze, “The Domestication of Religion under So-
viet Communism,” in C. M. Hann, ed., Socialism: Ideas, Ideologies, and Local Practice 
(London, 1993), 148–56.
9. On these dynamics, especially in the colonial and postcolonial context, see Ta-
lal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, 2003); Ta-
lal Asad, “Reading a Modern Classic: W. C. Smith’s ‘The Meaning and End of Religion,’” 
History of Religions 40, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 205–22; and Peter van der Veer and Hartmut 
Lehmann, introduction to Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann, eds., Nation and 
Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia (Princeton, 1999), 3–14. For discussions of how 
these ideas work in the Russian context, see Mark D. Steinberg and Heather J. Coleman, 
“Introduction: Rethinking Religion in Modern Russian Culture,” in Mark D. Steinberg 
and Heather J. Coleman, eds., Sacred Stories: Religion and Spirituality in Modern Russia 
(Bloomington, 2007), 1–21; and Wanner, introduction.
10. On why atheism became so central to the revolutionaries’ mind-set, see Victo-
ria Frede, Doubt, Atheism, and the Nineteenth-Century Russian Intelligentsia (Madison, 
2011).
11. Andrew B. Stone, “Overcoming Peasant Backwardness: The Khrushchev Antireli-
gious Campaign and the Rural Soviet Union,” Russian Review 67, no. 2 (April 2008): 301.
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even violent fanatics, a handy foil to the new Soviet man; in others, they were 
dupes in need of enlightenment to allow them entry into the communist soci-
ety under construction.12 These rival images of the “believer” jostled, both of 
them meant to reinforce the binary between modernity and backwardness. In 
the l esh, however, people who professed a religious faith rarely conformed to 
either of these prototypes, a fact that made propaganda and ideological work 
involving their participation potentially hazardous, for they had the potential 
to unsettle the modernity-backwardness binary.
In his seminal study of late Soviet culture, Alexei Yurchak characterizes 
ideological representations as “normalized, ubiquitous, and predictable.”13 
Soviet propagandists at the time themselves would seem to concur: reports 
about atheist work were ot en critical of its repetitious and dull nature.14 It 
is intriguing, however, that Yurchak’s study does not address atheist work 
explicitly, despite the huge amount of time and resources that were devoted 
to it right up until the 1980s. I argue here that atheist projects in fact rep-
resent something of an exception to Yurchak’s picture, notwithstanding the 
concerns of contemporaries. The intimacy of the interviews, and the life-and-
death issues they addressed, made them less routinized and perhaps more 
volatile than suggested by Yurchak’s depiction of other ideological work. As 
Sonja Luehrmann writes, “Even during the decades known as the era of ‘stag-
nation,’ Soviet secular culture retained a measure of dynamism.”15
In the research projects examined here, atheist work was far from rou-
tinized, not least because it required the active participation of believers—
believers who were neither fanatics nor dupes. Organized by social scientists 
eager to pursue i eldwork now that the straitjacket of Stalinism had been cast 
of , the interviews brought members of the younger generation—the construc-
tors of tomorrow’s communism—into contact with those considered marginal 
to the Soviet community: religious believers, many of them elderly women. 
Some interviewees appeared cagey, anxious to give the right answer to their 
12. The term foil is taken from Zoe Knox, “Preaching the Kingdom Message: The Je-
hovah’s Witnesses and Soviet Secularization,” in Wanner, ed., State Secularism, 244–71. 
The media’s depiction of believers in the 1950s and 1960s is discussed in Miriam Dobson, 
“Child Sacrii ce in the Soviet Press: Sensationalism and the ‘Sectarian’ in the Post-Stalin 
Era,” Russian Review 73, no. 2 (April 2014), 237–59.
13. Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet 
Generation (Princeton, 2006), 14.
14. Writing about the Khrushchev era, Elena Zhidkova notes that the quality of lec-
tures was ot en considered unsatisfactory and that reports from party raikomy were full 
of criticism about the standard of atheist propaganda provided. Elena Zhidkova, “Anti-
religioznaia kampaniia vremen ‘ottepeli’ v Kuibyshevskoi oblast ,́” Neprikosnovennyi 
zapas 59, no. 3 (2008): 108–19, at magazines.russ.ru/nz/2008/3/zh12.html (last accessed 
October 16, 2014).
15. Sonja Luehrmann, Secularism Soviet Style: Teaching Atheism and Religion in a 
Volga Republic (Bloomington, 2011), 10. Victoria Smolkin-Rothrock notes that Leonid 
Brezhnev’s attempt at ideological revival at the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress, in March 
1971, led to the CC resolution of July 16, 1971, “on strengthening atheist work among the 
 population” and suggests that atheist work was increasingly complex and contested. 
Viktoriia Smolkin-Rotrok, “Problema ‘obyknovennoi’ sovetskoi smerti: Material΄noe 
i dukhovnoe v ateisticheskoi kosmologii,” Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkov΄ 30, nos. 3–4 
(2012): 430–63.
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semioi  cial visitors, but others apparently welcomed the opportunity to speak 
about lives that were hard and lonely, perhaps l attered that their thoughts on 
God and the at erlife mattered at er all.
This kind of i eldwork was, of course, only one side of the Soviet state’s ap-
proach to religion and its followers. The persecution of those whose faith was 
less “domesticated,” who worshipped publicly and campaigned for greater 
religious freedom, was unambiguous, and their ordeals were reported widely 
outside the USSR at the time.16 By the i nal years of the USSR, some religious 
communities clearly felt their faith was incompatible with Soviet identity. For 
example, from the 1970s, a Protestant emigration movement mobilized on the 
basis that it was simply not possible to be Christian in a communist country.17 
Yet the more equivocal encounters between representatives of the atheist es-
tablishment and the believers they interviewed under examination here are 
also deserving of attention, for they bring to light some of the dii  culties the 
atheist project encountered when it tried to develop techniques other than 
brute repression.
Ideological work with believers was fundamental to the Soviet project 
for a number of reasons, I suggest, but one key reason was that it reinforced 
a dialectical relationship between religion as backwardness and atheism as 
progress. These attempts to establish “religion” as the antithesis of everything 
“Soviet,” particularly pronounced under Khrushchev, were ot en rather fragile 
and contested, as other recent work also testii es. Victoria Smolkin- Rothrock’s 
study of the journal Nauka i religiia (Science and religion), founded in 1959, 
suggests the atheist establishment was already in a state of crisis by the mid-
sixties, its staf  concerned that the combative approach taken so far was fail-
ing to meet readers’ spiritual needs. The 1964 proposal to ditch the title Nauka 
i religiia rel ected editorial concern that depicting “science” and “religion” as 
adversaries was no longer the most ef ective tool for creating atheist disposi-
tions (even if the new titles put forward for consideration still implicitly sug-
gested “the binary opposition of light, science, reason, and life, on the one 
hand,” and “darkness, irrationality, and death,” on the other).18 Luehr mann’s 
anthropological work in the Volga region reveals that the experience and 
skills that cultural workers developed in the Soviet era, sometimes directly in 
the sphere of atheist instruction, have ot en been transferred to new roles as 
religious leaders in post-Soviet times; rather than presenting this as a narra-
tive in which “religious and secular form . . . simply replace and supersede one 
another,” she speaks of the “constant back-and-forth between the dynamics 
of secularization and theologization.”19 Focusing on concrete moments when 
representatives of the atheist establishment and the believer met face-to-face 
16. See, for example, Michael Bourdeaux, Patriarch and Prophets: Persecution of the 
Russian Orthodox Church Today (London, 1969).
17. See, for example, the petitions written by Pentecostals in the 1970s and 1980s, pre-
served in the Arkhiv istorii inakomysliia v SSSR (1953–1987) Mezhdunarodnogo obshches-
tva “Memorial,” f. 103, op. 2, dd., 11 and 12, and f. 102, op. 1, d. 43. Several authors an-
nounce they would like to go to any non-atheist country.
18. Victoria Smolkin-Rothrock, “The Ticket to the Soviet Soul: Science, Religion, and 
the Spiritual Crisis of Late Soviet Atheism,” Russian Review 73, no. 2 (April 2014): 171–97.
19. Luehrmann, Secularism Soviet Style, 16, 71–75.
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in the mid-sixties, I examine this kind of “back-and-forth” and reveal just how 
brittle the religion-atheism binary could prove in practice.
A Decade of Scientii c Atheism, 1954–1964
Before proceeding to the interviews themselves, it is important to establish 
the context in which they were produced. Antireligious campaigns date back 
to the earliest years of Soviet power, but the distinctive feature of the atheist 
measures explored here is the role played by academic institutions. “Scientii c 
atheism” of ered an alternative to the more violent techniques ot en deployed. 
The growing inl uence of social scientists who rejected crude socioeconomic 
models to explain religious belief in favor of more historicized, nuanced ac-
counts brought into existence the individualized and ot en idiosyncratic en-
counters studied in the main body of this article.
Antireligious propaganda fell into abeyance during World War II and was 
revived at er Iosif Stalin’s death: i rst with a short crusade in 1954, later a more 
sustained campaign during the last i ve years of Khrushchev’s rule. In these 
years, places of worship were shut, ordinary believers faced discrimination, 
and religious leaders were arrested.20 Abusing the criminal justice system for 
such ideological ends seems to run contrary to the ethos of de-Stalinization, 
but in other ways the campaigns were in keeping with the spirit of the era, 
especially the renewed commitment to constructing communism. Moreover, 
the party’s desire to raise the new Soviet person and to eradicate the “vestiges 
of the past” (perezhitki proshlogo) converged with the revival of the social 
sciences, a fact that was, in time, to provide a distinctive dimension to antire-
ligious work, especially in comparison with prewar antecedents.
In 1954, the Central Committee decreed that the social sciences should 
play a role in cultivating atheist worldviews, and over the course of the next 
two years, new sections devoted to the study of religion and atheism were 
opened at the history and philosophy institutes at the Academy of  Sciences.21 
20. For recent scholarship on the antireligious campaigns, see Zhidkova, “Anti-
religioznaia kampaniia”; Irina Paert, “Demystifying the Heavens: Women, Religion and 
Khrushchev’s Anti-religious Campaign, 1954–1964,” in Susan E. Reid, Melanie Ilič, and 
Lynne Attwood, eds., Women in the Khrushchev Era (Basingstoke, 2004), 203–21; Stone, 
“Overcoming Peasant Backwardness”; Tatiana A. Chumachenko, Church and State in So-
viet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the Khrushchev Years, ed. and trans. 
Edward E. Roslof (Armonk, 2002); M. V. Shkarovskii, Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov΄ i 
Sovetskoe gosudarstvo v 1943–1964 godakh: Ot “peremiriia” k novoi voine (St. Petersburg, 
1995); Michael Froggatt, “Renouncing Dogma, Teaching Utopia: Science in Schools under 
Khrushchev,” in Polly Jones, ed., The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural 
and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era (London, 2006), 250–66; and Scott Kenworthy, 
“The Revival of Monastic Life in the Trinity-Sergius Lavra at er World War II,” in Wanner, 
ed., State Secularism, 117–58.
21. On the 1954 decree, see John Anderson, Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet 
Union and Successor States (Cambridge, Eng., 1994), 6. On the opening of the historians’ 
sector in 1955, see Arkhiv Rossiisskoi akademii nauk (ARAN), f. 457 (Otdelenie istoriia 
Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1936–1999), op. 1 (1945–1956), d. 390 (Perepiska s Muzeem istorii 
religii i ateizma o sozdanii sektora religii i ateizma pri institute istoriia, 1955), list (l.) 10. 
On the development in philosophy, see ARAN, f. 1922 (Institut i losoi i Akademii Nauk 
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Academics were increasingly able to conduct active research.22 This was 
a radical departure and threw up a host of methodological and theoretical 
issues. According to the records of discussions held at the Academy of Sci-
ences, not all were happy with the new, “scientii c” trajectory antireligious 
work was taking: some older colleagues expressed nostalgia for their days 
as  bezbozhniki, with one arguing in 1960 that the campaigning style (kam-
paneiskaia liniia) of the past was needed.23 At the same seminar, there were 
also debates about the extent to which the purely materialist explanations of 
the Stalin era were adequate for explaining religion’s tenacity. One partici-
pant, for example, argued that scholars’ expectation of a link between “back-
wardness” and  religiosity had not been met. In fact, he said, it was in the 
advanced (peredovye) collective farms that religious activity was higher: once 
a  kolhkhoznitsa has a washing machine, she has more time to go to church.24 
L. N. Mitrokhin, a member of the Institute of Philosophy and soon a leading 
authority on Protestantism in the USSR, countered that there was in fact a link 
between material conditions and belief but agreed it was not a direct one.25 As 
the revolution receded, blaming religious belief on socioeconomic dif erence—
understood to be a feature of capitalism and not socialism—was increasingly 
problematic. According to Sergei Alymov’s recent work, any claim that such 
“perezhitki” were the product of deep-rooted social inequalities inherent in 
SSSR, 1936–1980), op. 1 (nauchno-organizatsionnye materialy instituta), d. 854 (protokoly 
zasedanii sektora ateizma, 1956).
22. One of the i rst i eld expeditions was to study “sectarians” in Tambov region and 
was led by A. I. Klibanov (a historian) in 1959 but also involved collaboration with col-
leagues from the philosophy institute, including L. N. Mitrokhin. See ARAN, f. 1922, op. 1, 
d. 1002 (Stenogramma soveshchaniia ob organizatsii izucheniia prichin sushchestvova-
niia religioznykh verovanii i putiakh ikh preodoleniia, 1960), ll. 47–60; I. A. Malakhova, 
“Istoricheskaia nauka v SSSR: O rabote nauchnoi ekspeditsii po izucheniiu sovremen-
nogo sektantstva,” Voprosy istorii (February 1960): 218–19; and L. M. Mitrokhin, “Izuche-
nie sektantstva v Tambovskoi oblasti,” Voprosy i losoi i (January 1960): 143–48. For 
ethnographers’ involvement, see ARAN, f. 457, op. 1, d. 208 (Stenogramma arkheologo-
 etnograi cheskoi sessii OIN AN SSSR, posviashchennoi itogam i perspektivam ekspedit-
sionnykh, 6 aprelia 1959). For a discussion of the connections between history, philoso-
phy, ethnography, and folklore studies (presented in a positive light), see Vladimir N. 
Basilov, “The Study of Religions in Soviet Ethnography,” in Ernest Gellner, ed., Soviet and 
Western Anthropology (New York, 1980), 231–42.
23. This comment was made at a meeting of scholars held at the Institute of Philoso-
phy’s Atheism Section in June 1960 to discuss “The Reasons for Religion’s Survival and 
Methods for Overcoming It,” a volume which the team had been charged with writing 
by the CPSU Central Committee earlier that year. ARAN, f. 1922, op. 1, d. 1002, ll. 84–89, 
115–18.
24. ARAN, f. 1922, op. 1, d. 1002, l. 45. A few years later, a Ukrainian study would 
make a similar argument: A. A. Eryshev gave examples of economically more devel-
oped villages that nonetheless had high levels of religious activity and compared them 
with others where people “lived materially worse” but were for the most part nonbeliev-
ers. Eryshev maintained that the relationship between economic factors and religiosity 
should be understood in more general terms, and he linked the postwar religious revival 
to the dii  cult economic circumstances of those years. A. A. Eryshev, “Opyt konkretno-
 sotsiologicheskikh issledovanii religioznosti naseleniia na Ukraine,” in A. I. Klibanov, 
ed., Konkretnye issledovaniia sovremennykh religioznykh verovanii: Metodika (Moscow, 
1967), 143.
25. ARAN, f. 1922, op. 1, d. 1002, l. 55.
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the country’s  “socialist” economy bordered on the heretical.26 One scholar 
was certainly troubled at i nding reference in a colleague’s work to “dispari-
ties in property” (imushchestvennoe neravenstvo) as the cause of religion’s 
survival.27
Despite—or perhaps because of—these dii  culties, in January 1964 a Cen-
tral Committee decree brought together this rather dif use research under the 
auspices of a newly formed Institute of Scientii c Atheism.28 At a major confer-
ence held at the institute in December 1964, the rector of the CPSU’s Academy 
of Social Sciences, Iu. P. Franstev, opened proceedings by noting a shit : “so-
cial scientists” (obshchestvovedy) were abandoning literary sources and mate-
rials, he said, in favor of “concrete sociological research.”29 By this, Frantsev 
did not mean simply collecting and analyzing statistical i gures. The institute’s 
work certainly did generate “hard” evidence, but in these years scholars—like 
Frantsev—frequently expressed a preference for qualitative i ndings.30 At the 
same time, researchers moved away from purely socioeconomic explanations 
in favor of individualized methodologies that allowed them to explore the 
personal dimension. L. V. Mandrygin, from the Department of Philosophy at 
Voronezh Agricultural University, for example, endorsed an intensive, almost 
personalized, approach: “We must get to know the kind of life a person has 
led, the fate of the believer and his family, the situation in which he i nds 
himself, particularly the circumstances that have let  the most vivid imprint 
on his consciousness. This is very important because studying an individual 
is like seeing a drop of water that rel ects the concrete social relations the 
person is experiencing in a given period, and as a result, in that period of 
society’s historical development.”31 What Mandrygin had in mind with this 
formulation became clear in the following sections of his address in which 
he detailed a i ve-hour conversation with a Baptist, Mariia K., from the Mos-
cow factory Manometr. He presented her religious belief not as the result of 
her socioeconomic background but as a rel ection of traumatic events in the 
country’s history, such as collectivization (K.’s father had been “repressed” 
and her mother died during the famine), the war, and a period of “postwar 
dii  culties.”32 With the ef ects of the Twenty-Second Party Congress not yet 
eroded, Mandrygin could blame not only the war but also the terror: Stalin’s 
26. Sergei Alymov, “Poniatie ‘perezhitok’ i sovetskie sotsial΄nye nauki v 1950–1960-e 
gg.,” Antropologicheskii forum, no. 16 (2012): 261–87.
27. ARAN, f. 1922, op. 1, d. 919 (protokoly zasedanii sektora, 1957).
28. RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 1 (Proekt postanovleniia TsK KPSS o nauchnoi razrabotke 
problem ateizma, 1964–1970), l. 1. See also Victoria Smolkin, “‘Sviato mesto pusto ne by-
vaet’: Ateisticheskoe vospitanie v Sovetskom Soiuze, 1964–1968,” Neprikosnovennyi za-
pas 65, no. 3 (2009), at magazines.russ.ru/nz/2009/3/sm5.html (last accessed October 16, 
2014).
29. RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 18 (Stenogramma nauchno-teoreticheskoi konferentsii 
 Instituta nauchnogo ateizma “metodika i rezul t́aty konkretnykh issledovanii religioz-
nykh perezhitkov,” 22 dekabria 1964), ll. 4–11.
30. Criticism of empirical approaches is particularly strong in L. N. Mitrokhin, “O 
metodologii issledovanii sovremennoi religioznosti,” in Klibanov, ed., Konkretnye issle-
dovaniia sovremennykh religioznykh verovanii, 35–52.
31. RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 18, l. 53.
32. Ibid., l. 54.
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cult generated a kind of blind faith, he argued, and instilled in people a sense 
of powerlessness over their own fate, which meant that a person stopped be-
ing a “creator of history [tvorets istorii] and was instead turned into either a 
small cog [vintik] or an instrument of God’s will.”33
At this landmark 1964 conference, Frantsev also claimed that lengthy 
interviews not only helped researchers gain knowledge of the religious 
land scape but also had an ef ect on it: believers would begin to rel ect on 
the nature of their faith and perhaps start to question their convictions.34 As 
Smolkin- Rothrock argues, those charged with carrying out the i eldwork were 
expected to both “accurately describe Soviet believers and at the same time 
transform these believers into atheists.”35 The concerns of the former bez-
bozhniki who worried that academic research lacked the campaigning spirit of 
their earlier antireligious campaigns were thus—at least in theory—allayed: 
the work being carried out by the institute was itself to contribute to the ero-
sion of religious belief and to the creation of a society of atheists.
The social scientists who met at the Institute of Scientii c Atheism to dis-
cuss their research ot en referred to their own adventures in the i eld, but their 
contact with believers was not always i rst-hand. They regularly outsourced 
the interviewing to party propagandists, atheism lecturers, club managers, 
teachers, and—overwhelmingly—students.36 Some were party or Komsomol 
members, but not all. As representatives of the atheist establishment, they 
would meet with a believer, sometimes on a number of occasions, and con-
duct an interview, following a rough template of questions, but they lacked 
the researchers’ training and experience. The recruit setting out on a mission 
that was both scientii c and didactic in purpose would have been aware of 
certain conventions he should follow, but a good deal of autonomy and impro-
visation was required, both in the conduct of the interview and in the write-up 
that followed. The involvement of young people in the process rel ects a third 
purpose to the interviews: the reinforcement of the atheist message among 
Soviet youth. Smolkin-Rothrock argues that in the 1960s, there was concern 
about the growth of “indif erence”—in the place of convinced atheism—as 
well as about the survival of religious belief itself.37 In addition to helping 
33. Ibid., l. 58. For a discussion of Stalin’s use of the term vintik (which he famously 
adopted in the 1945 Victory Parade), see R. W. Davies, Soviet History in the Gorbachev 
Revolution (Bloomington, 1989), 80–81. What is particularly striking is the extent to which 
Mandrygin’s comments also made it into print, in L. V. Mandrygin, Vnutrennyi mir veru-
iushchego i prichiny religioznosti (Moscow, 1965), 20.
34. RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 18, l. 4.
35. Smolkin, “‘Sviato mesto pusto ne byvaet.’”
36. Explaining the methodology he had used, the lead researcher on a 1962 project 
explained that he had recruited 25 students enrolled in evening classes in the atheism 
department at the University of Marxism-Leninism, 116 students from the Institute of En-
gineering and Construction, 10 scientii c workers from the medical institute, 30 agitators 
from the party raikom, and 5 members of the regional board of the Knowledge (Znanie) 
Society. M. K. Tepliakov, “Materialy k issledovaniiu religioznosti naseleniia Voronezha i 
Voronezhskoi oblasti,” in Klibanov, ed., Konkretnye issledovaniia sovremennykh religioz-
nykh verovanii, 144–45. Luehrmann also notes that teachers and academics recruited their 
students. See Luehrmann, Secularism Soviet Style, 9.
37. Smolkin, “‘Sviato mesto pusto ne byvaet.’”
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wean believers from their faith, the Institute of Scientii c Atheism’s work was 
meant to counter this worrying trend.
The interviews were thus three-fold in purpose: scientii c (recording the 
informant’s beliefs); didactic or missionary (transforming the believer into 
an atheist); and performative (reai  rming the superiority of educated, atheist 
culture). They show that the mobilizing ethos that had characterized the So-
viet regime from its very inception remained alive at the dawn of the Brezh nev 
era, but the interviews’ multiple, at times competing, goals made for uncer-
tain results.
Identifying the Believer: Identity and Narrative
In the mid-sixties, the development of scientii c atheism as a social science, 
particularly the turn to sociology and psychology, gave ordinary believers 
new importance: they were not just a hangover from the prerevolutionary 
past, destined for extinction as a consequence of socioeconomic progress, 
but individuals whose personal experience and thoughts mattered. Rather 
than disappearing into the mists of time, he—or, as was commonly assumed, 
she—was actively sought out, as both the subject of scientii c research and a 
participant in the ritual of the interview, an event that, as we have seen, was 
intended to have a transformative ef ect on her. But who was the “believer”?
For Soviet social scientists in the 1960s, as for their contemporary coun-
terparts, the question of how to measure religiosity and identify believers was 
never straightforward.38 Although purely statistical research was sidelined, 
attempts to quantify the number of believers within Soviet society persisted, 
though the classii cations became more nuanced and gradated. One survey 
conducted in Voronezh region in 1968, for example, identii ed six categories, 
ranging from “committed/active” believer to “committed/active”  unbeliever.39 
Results indicated that approximately half of the population were passive un-
believers, about 12 percent “active” unbelievers, and a similar proportion 
believers (including both the “active” and “passive”). About three-quarters 
of the latter were women; half were over sixty.40 Perhaps unsurprisingly pub-
lished texts from the time give i gures suggesting somewhat higher levels of 
committed atheism.41
In the Ivanovo study of 1964–65 examined here, the focus was exclusively 
on believers, most of whom were already the subject of “individual work” by 
38. Sergei Filatov and Roman Lunkin, “Statistika religioznoi i konfessional΄noi pri-
nadlezhnosti rossiian: Kakim arshinom merit΄?,” in S. B. Filatov, ed., Religiia i rossiiskoe 
mnogoobrazie (St. Petersburg, 2011), 5–30.
39. Using anonymous questionnaires, the researchers had obtained answers from 
one in every twenty-seven members of the adult population. RGASPI, f. 606, op., 4, d. 131 
(Otchet Voronezhskogo opornogo punkta Instituta, 1968), ll. 3–7, 38–40.
40. RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 131, ll. 3, 6.
41. The published results of an earlier study in Voronezh gave 38 percent as atheists 
and 24 percent as “nonbelievers who still made some concessions to the religious atti-
tudes of relatives or acquaintances.” Tepliakov, “Materialy k issledovaniiu,” 146. A study 
in Belorussia put the level of atheism as high as 68 percent. E. G. Filimonov, “Problemy 
konkretno-sotsiologicheskikh issledovanii religioznosti v sovetskoi literatury (1961–66),” 
in Klibanov, ed., Konkretnye issledovaniia sovremennykh religioznykh verovanii, 229.
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agitators and propagandists.42 Of the fourteen interviewees selected for this 
article because of the fullness of their responses, twelve were women. Of the 
two men, one was a Baptist (and a prisoner). The other informants were all Or-
thodox. The majority of the women were pensioners. For the most part, the in-
terviewers identii ed their subject simply as “the believer”; a few went further, 
with four of the transcripts noting that the person was “not an activist within 
the religious community and was not dependent on it materially.”43 Using the 
criteria of the Voronezh survey, they would probably be classii ed as “formal, 
passive” (formal΄nye, passivnye) believers or even “wavering” (kolebliushchie-
sia); they had probably already proven to be more receptive to “individual 
work” than those with a strong sense of their own religious identity (who may 
well have resented such ef orts as an unwelcome intrusion).
Beyond this, it was the stories the interviewees presented that provide 
researchers—both in the 1960s and today—with a sense of who they were. Let 
us begin with the transcript of the meeting with Anastasia Alekseeva.44 As 
presented by the interviewer—an issue addressed later—it is a coherent nar-
rative in which she emerges as a thoughtful, critical woman who shared the 
Soviet regime’s skepticism toward the church as an institution but held on 
to her belief in God. Now a pensioner living in Ivanovo, she had grown up in 
the countryside and attended a church school; her mother and grandmother 
made her pray several times a day and her grandfather was a church war-
den. But hers was not a blind faith and she provides a vivid picture of early 
 twentieth-century anticlerical sentiment.45 They hated their village priest, 
she said, because he was debauched and had broken the seal of confession, 
spreading rumors about a parishioner who had buried an illegitimate baby. 
She used to go to pray at the Suzdal΄ convent with her mother but harbored 
doubts about the ef ectiveness of praying to relics (which she was not able to 
see) and had suspicions about the relationships between the nuns and neigh-
boring monks. In the 1930s, when churches were shut, she began to pray at 
home and even at the time of the interview only attended services on impor-
tant holidays. It was better to pray at home, she said, because churches were 
42. According to a Soviet publication from 1966, four surveys conducted by the Insti-
tute of Scientii c Atheism in 1964–65 resulted in 906 interviews with Orthodox believers 
(veriushchie—priverzhentsy pravoslaviia). In fact, as we shall see, a small number of Chris-
tians of other denominations were also included. It was noted that “systematic individual 
work” with them had already been carried out by agitators and propagandist-atheists. Of 
the 906 interviews, 139 were conducted in the Tambov and Ivanovo regions. N. P. Andria-
nov, R. A. Lopatkin, and V. V. Pavliuk, Osobennosti sovremennogo religioznogo soznaniia 
(Moscow, 1966), 5, 43.
43. RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 133, ll. 122–23; RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 134, ll. 85, 106, 
178–79.
44. The names of interviewers and informants have been changed throughout.
45. Gregory Freeze distinguishes between anticlerical sentiment (“a kind of dif use 
hostility . . . directed mainly at clerical foibles or individual clerics”) and anticlerical-
ism (a doctrinal movement in which “the ‘ism’ has real meaning”); the latter, he sug-
gests, was relatively weak in nineteenth-century Russia. Anticlerical sentiment seems the 
most appropriate description here. Gregory L. Freeze, “A Case of Stunted Anticlericalism: 
Clergy and Society in Imperial Russia,” European History Quarterly 13, no. 2 (April 1983): 
177–200.
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too crowded and she did not enjoy listening to the women’s gossip. This nar-
rative of her religious journey contains several ideas that had long been cen-
tral to Soviet antireligious propaganda: the corrupt nature of the priesthood, 
the futility of praying to relics, and the “backwardness” of female-dominated 
church congregations.46
But this withdrawal from church life did not neatly equate with a rejection 
of religious belief. Her isolation from the communal life of the church obliged 
Alekseeva to reach her own interpretations of the Bible. Although identii ed 
by the interviewer as “semiliterate” (malogramotnaia), she had begun reading 
the Gospels three years earlier and, i nding that it said nothing about fasting, 
decided that this was an invention by the clergy. On the occasions when she 
did attend church, she liked some sermons but with others could “neither 
agree with the priest nor with God.” She cited an example that she attributed 
to Elijah: the prophet was, she said, rebuked for punishing a rich man who 
stole grain from a poor man by scattering the rich man’s grain; God told Elijah 
that if he was to start punishing everyone so severely, he would have to scatter 
them all across the world.47 Alekseeva argued that God’s rebuke was an injus-
tice. “The outcome is that no one defends the poor, neither Elijah, whom God 
bars from punishing the rich, nor God.”48 Despite these doubts, she believed 
God created the natural world, she prayed regularly to the saints, and she lit 
small candles, regretful that she could not af ord bigger ones.
A pensioner of the same generation, Ol ǵa Kuznetsova, had attended a 
church school before the revolution, but in the early years of Soviet power her 
religious commitment had waned, particularly once she entered the ranks of 
the Komsomol. In 1938, however, tragedy struck: her husband was arrested, 
wrongly convicted, and died in prison. Following this bereavement, coupled 
with the death of her parents in the same year, Kuznetsova lost her “spiritual 
equilibrium” (to use the terminology applied by her interviewer). “God again 
i rmly entered her consciousness,” it was noted. As recounted by her inter-
viewer, at least, Kuznetsova’s life story i t neatly with the thesis put forward 
by the Voronezh researcher, Mandrygin, who made a connection between ter-
ror and faith, arguing that believers were ot en people who had been caught 
up “in the violent maelstrom of events that are linked with key landmarks 
in the development of Soviet society,” people whose hopes and plans had 
46. On these aspects of antireligious propaganda in the 1920s, see Daniel Peris, 
Storming the Heavens: The Soviet League of the Militant Godless (Ithaca, 1998), 75–86.
47. It is hard to identify the story. It seems most likely that she in fact refers to a story 
from the life of Saint Spyridon: During a time of famine, greedy grain vendors who had 
cunningly stocked up were selling their grain at a very high price. A poor man whose fam-
ily were starving asked one vendor to show mercy, but he refused to give anything away. 
The poor man went to Spyridon in despair, and the following night torrential rains fell, 
sweeping the grains away and scattering them widely; the following morning the poor 
could scoop up what they needed, and the rich man was punished for his lack of mercy. 
Given the association between Elijah and extreme weather in Slavic culture, a misattribu-
tion seems possible. There does not, however, seem to be a sense that God was critical of 
the rich man’s punishment. A. V. Bugaevskii, Sviatitel΄ Spiridon, episkop Trimifuntskii: Ego 
zhizn ,́ podvigi i chudotvoreniia, izlozhennye po grecheskim rukopisiam (Moscow, 2005), at 
spyridon-trimifuntsky.narod.ru/zitie_003.html (last accessed October 1, 2014).
48. RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 133, ll. 2–3.
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been shattered by “unexpected events” and by “elements of spontaneity” 
(elementy stikhiinosti).49 Kuznetsova’s return to her faith was largely an in-
ternalized one, and she tried to avoid praying in front of her children. When 
not too busy with work and raising three children single-handedly, she did 
like to attend church for religious holidays and enjoyed the “solemn beauty of 
the service,” but she, like Alekseeva, confessed to some doubts: “She doesn’t 
always believe the priests’ sermons. She sometimes reads religious books but 
doesn’t always believe what is written. She prays without icons, addressing 
God ‘directly.’”
The 1930s af ected Anastasia Alekseeva and Ol ǵa Kuznetsova in quite 
dif erent ways, but it was in this decade that both women developed religious 
practices and beliefs in which the church establishment played a marginal 
role and their relationship with God and scripture was direct, independent, 
and to some extent critical. Their stories rel ect the domestication that schol-
ars have attributed to the Stalin-era assault on religious institutions.50 Speak-
ing in the wake of Khrushchev’s antireligious campaigns, and both surely 
aware of their depositions’ eventual audience, the women undoubtedly ac-
centuated their detached attitude toward the Orthodox establishment. Each 
woman surely thought carefully about how to articulate her life story in a 
way that projected her identity as a member of the Soviet community. But 
both apparently found it possible to do so without denying their religious be-
liefs, either by stressing their anticlericalism or by invoking the terror, a topic 
that in 1964 had not yet become entirely taboo. As we see in the next section, 
the beliefs they and others espoused also suggest the boundary between the 
Christian and the Soviet was a permeable one, despite the best ef orts of So-
viet propaganda to assert the “otherness” of religious faith.
Heretical Beliefs? The Soviet At erlife and the Quest 
for Social Justice
In his study of religiosity in postwar Ukraine, P. M. Bondarchuk uses a num-
ber of the studies resulting from the kind of i eldwork initiated by the Institute 
of Scientii c Atheism. On the basis of these studies, published from the mid-
sixties until the late 1980s, he argues that the period saw a signii cant shit  in 
belief, with increasing numbers of those self-identifying as believers taking 
an individualistic approach to religious doctrine, particularly younger cohorts 
who sought accommodation between their Christian faith and materialist 
(stykhiino-materialistychni) understandings of the world and who had less ex-
perience of church attendance.51 Based on the original interview transcripts, 
the analysis I of er in this article certainly supports Bondarchuk’s claim that 
respondents did not reproduce Christian doctrine uniformly. However, this 
heterodoxy appears to have been common to all generations, particularly in 
terms of their vision of the at erlife (a key focus of the Ivanovo interviews). 
49. RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 18, l. 56.
50. Dragadze, “The Domestication of Religion.”
51. P. M. Bondarchuk, Religiinist΄ naselennia Ukrainy u 40–80-kh rokakh XX st.: 
Sotsiokul t́urni vplyvy, osoblyvosti, tendentsii zmin (Kiev, 2009), 134–47.
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Moreover, rather than ai  rming the inevitable rise of scientii c worldviews, 
informants’ statements suggest a rather more complicated intermeshing of the 
Orthodox and the Soviet.
Interviewers were given a list of theological questions they should probe: 
How did the believer imagine God? Did she know the creed? What was her 
attitude to the Holy Trinity? What were her expectations for life beyond the 
grave?52 Some of the questions they were posed evidently perplexed the in-
terviewees. Ekaterina Cherentsova, for example, pictured God in the form of 
a man but could not clearly imagine the nature of the Trinity and admitted 
she had not contemplated it much (the interviewer commented knowingly 
that “she believes blindly in the dogma”). She did, however, speak at some 
length of the at erlife. When the body decays, she explained, it goes through 
a forty-day trial before being sent to heaven or hell, depending on God’s as-
sessment of the person.53 Like Cherentsova, many interviewees spoke of the 
forty-day trial, a tenet of Orthodox teaching but also a particularly impor-
tant phase in folk conceptions of death and the at erlife.54 Anna Gorbatova, 
a sixty-three-year-old housewife identii ed as being of the Orthodox faith but 
not a religious “activist,” believed that the soul was a “person in miniature” 
located inside the chest, a conception of the soul not uncommon in folk cul-
ture.55 At er death, Gorbatova said, the soul l ies away to the sky, but she did 
not countenance her own resurrection: according to the interviewer’s tran-
scription, she “had heard about judgment day from her grandparents, but she 
is doubtful that this judgment ever took place.”56 In contrast, Evgeniia Veli-
kanova, a seventy-eight-year-old pensioner from a family of laborers, said she 
did not believe in eternal life, asserting that the soul simply dissolves; nor 
did she believe in hell, arguing that God wouldn’t have created such a place 
for his children.57 All the women had clearly rel ected on what would happen 
52. RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 134, ll. 1–3.
53. Ibid., ll. 68–69.
54. Steve Smith explains that while the Orthodox Church never embraced the doc-
trine of purgatory developed by Catholic theologians, it did take up “the idea that the 
soul is subject to a particular judgment between the third and fortieth days at er death 
and that it then exists in an intermediate state in the abode of the dead (Hades) until 
the Last Judgment. During this intermediate period the soul receives a foretaste of the 
blessings or damnation that will be its i nal fate.” Stiv Smit [Steve Smith], “Spasenie du-
shi v Sovetskoi Rossii,” Neprikosnovennyi zapas 64, no. 2 (2009), at magazines.russ.ru/
nz/2009/2/ss16.html (last accessed October 16, 2014). Elizabeth Warner suggests that the 
forty-day transitional phase is particularly important in folk beliefs. Elizabeth A. Warner, 
“Russian Peasant Beliefs and Practices concerning Death and the Supernatural Collected 
in Novosokol΄niki Region, Pskov Province, Russia, 1995. Part I: The Restless Dead, Wiz-
ards and Spirit Beings,” Folklore 111, no. 1 (April 2000): 67–90; Warner, “Russian Peasant 
Beliefs and Practices concerning Death and the Supernatural Collected in Novosokol΄niki 
Region, Pskov Province, Russia, 1995. Part II: Death in Natural Circumstances,” Folklore 
111, no. 2 (October 2000): 255–81.
55. According to Steve Smith, the belief that the spirit required a body of some kind in 
order to be individuated “meant that folk conceptions of the soul frequently construed it 
as a small child, or a homunculus.” Smit, “Spasenie dushi.”
56. RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 134, ll. 178–79.
57. Ibid., l. 106.
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to them at er death, their formulations showing awareness (albeit sometimes 
confused) of church teaching as well as the imprint of folk concerns. They 
also highlight the independent nature of each woman’s conclusions about the 
at erlife—a topic on which almost all respondents had something substantive 
to say.
The women’s rel ections on what would happen in “that world” were 
shaped by the language and aesthetics of life in the Soviet Union and by their 
own experiences. Despite embracing quite traditional notions of the soul’s 
passage into the at erlife, Cherentsova, for example, had rather more innova-
tive ideas about the selection process for heaven.58 As reported, she believed 
that even a person who has committed quite signii cant sins on earth might be 
granted a place in heaven if he was “clever,” because such people are neces-
sary “for the building of paradise” (dlia stroitel śtva raia).59 Echoing a phrase 
that was ubiquitous in the early 1960s—the building of communism—this 
formulation suggested she considered a person’s ability to contribute to so-
ciety, and to help achieve progress, of greater value than purely moral quali-
ties. Another interviewee, thirty-i ve-year-old Zoia Strelkova, a cleaner at the 
children’s library in Ivanovo, apparently “dissatisi ed with life because she 
doesn’t have her own corner, her own specialization, personal life, or family,” 
believed in the eternity of the spirit, saying, “I will die, but my soul will live 
forever. Death is when we die and that’s that. But the soul is eternal, and at er 
my death it will suf er torment for forty days, the angels and the antichrist will 
be close by, the angels noting all the good characteristics, the devil the bad 
ones, and whichever side weighs more will be where the soul goes, I’m not 
scared of death.” In her mind’s eye, she had a clear idea of what heaven would 
be like. “Heaven,” she said, “is a place where there is everything: food, honey, 
apples, an apartment, the soul can be joyful. Hell—there the soul boils in tar, 
it is sickening, there is nowhere to go, you must languish forever.”60 Her image 
of heaven included the perhaps universal dream of bountiful food but also a 
reward specii c to Soviet life: the much-coveted kvartira—something out of 
reach for most unmarried cleaning women in the USSR.
The living conditions of Anna Bylkova were perhaps more dire still. An il-
literate sixty-i ve-year-old, she shared a kind of cellar (podval΄noe pomeshche-
nie) in Ivanovo. She was Orthodox but only attended church for religious holi-
days. The summary of her interview is an unusually short one, but its richness 
makes it worth citing in full.
The believer thinks that everything was created by God, that we are all in 
God’s hands [khodim pod bogom] and live by his mercy. Has a confused un-
derstanding of the soul, but thinks that it (the soul) is located inside a per-
son. Upon death, the soul leaves the body in the form of its owner and stands 
before God’s court. The soul of sinners lives forever in hell; the soul of the 
innocent in heaven.
58. Ibid., ll. 68–69.
59. Ibid., l. 69.
60. Ibid., l. 157. Also cited in Andrianov, Lopatkin, and Pavliuk, Osobennosti sovre-
mennogo religioznogo soznaniia, 41.
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The interviewee fears death, fears illness.
Prays for the dead. Goes to church to pray for forgiveness for the sins of 
the dead, and her own.
Thinks that at Easter the spirits of the dead sit at the table with her and 
share the meal, although the souls of the sinful stand at the threshold. On 
such days there should be no swearing at the table as this scares of  the visit-
ing spirits.
Anna Ivanovna thinks that people are guests on earth; their permanent 
living place [postoiannoe mestozhitel śtvo] is in the world beyond the grave.
The time for Judgment Day will come, the call will sound and all will 
stand up before the court. Sinners will fall into hell, which she imagines as 
a huge cauldron: some will be roasted in pans, others will drag rocks, water. 
She imagines heaven as a large garden with an abundance of l owers—“like 
a public garden” [“napodobie skvera”].
Thinks that most people have little chance of getting into heaven; basi-
cally only those who perished during the Patriotic War will go to heaven, and 
those who committed suicide stand no chance.
Why she thinks this, she cannot explain.
However, she thinks that those who suf er on earth will i nd comfort in 
the at erlife, and the reverse. For herself, she would like to i nd deliverance 
from the woman who shares her room [sosedka po komnate]—Liusia. She is 
not entirely satisi ed with life—she has always been a single woman, and 
does not have her own apartment.
The believer is not active either at work or in the community. In the at er-
life she hopes to i nd consolation, to meet with the deceased who were close 
to her—her sisters.
Doesn’t make preparations for the at erlife, although sometimes vis-
its churches, to pray for her sins. Leads a full-blooded life [zhivet polno-
krovnoi zhizn΄iu], quarrels with her [female] neighbors, uses bad language, 
and so on.
Her notion of resurrection is very vague, experiences fear regarding 
“judgment day,” but this doesn’t disturb her spiritual equilibrium.61
Thus ended the report composed by I. M. Il΄ina, who identii ed herself as a 
nonparty, thirty-year-old graduate taking a course in the Department of Sci-
entii c Atheism at the University of Marxism-Leninism.
In the visions recorded by anthropologists and folklorists, heaven is ot en 
imagined as an uncultivated, natural place, ot en with grassy i elds, woods, 
and huts, much like the rural Russian landscape.62 In contrast, for Bylkova—a 
former peasant now living on the margins of city life—heaven has a distinctly 
Soviet feel to it: described as a small urban park (napodobie skvera), para-
dise would resemble a spruced-up Soviet city center. It was a place where the 
unremitting zhilishchnyi vopros of Soviet life would i nally be resolved and 
a postoiannoe mestozhitel śtvo awarded. Also like Cherentsova, she had un-
usual, and in a sense Sovietized, criteria for a person to win entry to heaven: 
self-sacrii ce in the Great Fatherland War.
61. RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 134, ll. 180–81.
62. Faith Wigzell, “Reading the Map of Heaven and Hell in Russian Popular Ortho-
doxy: Examining the Usefulness of the Concepts of Dvoeverie and Binary Oppositions,” 
Forum for Anthropology and Culture, no. 2 (2005): 347–50.
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Even from the brief summary of ered by the interviewer, the reader gains 
a tangible sense of the rather lonely, thwarted life led by Bylkova: without a 
proper corner of her own, she resents Liusia, the woman with whom she is 
forced to cohabit, and longs for her deceased sisters. However, heaven of ers 
not only decent housing—clearly a key concern—but, in Bylkova’s view, some-
thing more radical. Herself at the bottom of the social hierarchy, she imagines 
the at erlife as a reversal of fates: “those who suf er on earth will i nd comfort 
in the at erlife, and the reverse.” There is a critical dimension to her religious 
disposition here, an implicit recognition of the huge inequalities that struc-
ture Soviet society and which she hopes to see overturned—a phenomenon 
only conceivable in the at erlife. The interviews with Strelkova and Bylkova 
suggest that some women who lived on the margins of society—pensioners, 
cleaning women, the single—envisaged heaven as a place where they would 
eventually be free from the indignities of collective living as they, poor, un-
married women, experienced it.63 There are echoes here of Alekseeva’s reac-
tion to God’s treatment of Elijah, described above, and her strong desire to see 
the poor defended.
As Faith Wigzell’s work demonstrates, the popular tendency to see the 
other world as an inversion of our own, with the rich punished and the de-
serving rewarded, is not in itself new.64 But in the Soviet context, the possibil-
ity of seeing Christianity’s message as one of social justice suggests ai  nities 
between Christianity and communism, and this was a proximity that atheist 
scholars strongly rebutted. In fact, the crib sheet provided to interviewers in-
cluded a question meant to expose this problematic association: “Is the be-
liever inclined to think that the construction of communism is the fuli lment 
of Christ’s teachings?”65 One elderly woman, Tat΄iana Likhacheva, replied as 
follows: “Yes, of course. God also wants us to live like that and wants people 
to live quietly, joyfully. And that’s why there will be communism—because 
God wants it.”66 Kuznetsova said, “I imagine Jesus Christ as an individual, 
as a good, kind, wise person who lived for a long time among the people and 
taught them kindness, justice, wisdom. Christ, it seems to me, was the i rst 
communist.”67 Others compartmentalized the sacred and secular, one respon-
dent answering, “It is people who build communism and God has nothing to 
do with this [bog tut ne prichem], but God helps good people in their lives and 
their work.”68 Another said she believed in communism and she believed in 
God and that “the country will arrive at communism, and God will still be 
God, all by himself [strana pridet k kommunizmu, a bog ostanetsa bogom, sam 
63. It has been argued that it was easier for a single person to preserve their faith 
within Soviet society than for those with a family; it was also, perhaps, more necessary. 
E. V. Beliakova, N. A. Beliakova, and E. B. Emchenko, Zhenshchina v pravoslavii: Tserkov-
noe pravo i rossiiskaia praktika (Moscow, 2011), 432.
64. Wigzell, “Reading the Map,” 355. See also Ia. K. Generozov, “Russkie narodnye 
predstaveleniia o zagrobnoi zhizni na osnovanii zaplachek, prichitanii, dukhovnykh 
stikhov,” in A. N. Sobolev, ed., Mifologiia slavian (St. Petersburg, 2000), 239.
65. RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 134, l. 3.
66. RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 133, l. 124.
67. Ibid., l. 85.
68. RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 134, l. 86.
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po sebe].”69 Perhaps these two women realized that—however counterintuitive 
it may have seemed—laying claim to a resemblance between Christ and Karl 
Marx was not in fact the desired response. Bylkova, however, was audacious: 
rather than communism being the embodiment of Christian values, she im-
plies, God’s heaven was the only solution to Soviet socialism’s inadequacies.
As he wrote up this research, R. A. Lopatkin, at the time a postgradu-
ate student at the CPSU’s Academy of Social Sciences, asserted that belief in 
the at erlife was, as should be expected, on the wane. But he also noted that 
in some cases, interviewees’ material aspirations were feeding into their vi-
sion of the at erlife—for example, the hope of obtaining one’s own apartment 
in heaven. Reasserting the didactic purpose of the interviews, he concluded 
that in discussing these issues, the propagandist had an ideal opportunity 
to help the believer understand “it is not in heaven but on earth, and only 
on earth, that fairness [spravdelivost΄] can be achieved.70 Other scholars ex-
plicitly attacked any association between Christianity and social justice. In 
1964, the philosopher A. A. Avetiś ian wrote with great derision of what he 
considered a current fashion in the west for “Christian socialism,” in his eyes, 
simply a cover for the materialistic, individualistic, reactionary mentality of 
the church.71 Five years later, M. M. Sheinman, a historian and member of the 
Nauka i religiia editorial board, published a critical account of Christian so-
cialism from the apostolic era to the modern day, stressing how this erstwhile 
religion of the poor had swit ly been conquered by the state and how the dis-
enfranchised who tried to use the “religious form” to protest against social in-
justice were branded heretics and silenced.72 In Nauka i religiia, too, attempts 
by the Orthodox Church to “modernize” itself were condemned, in particular, 
the proclaimed similarities between communism and Christianity.73 Resent-
ing any endeavor by the church to reinvent itself for the contemporary world, 
the atheist establishment worked hard to shore up oppositions. Science–faith 
remained one important axis, despite growing doubts about its ef ectiveness, 
but so too was Christianity–socialism: no one should be looking to God and 
heaven to escape the social inequalities the revolution had meant to end.
Performers, Missionaries, Collaborators, and Writers: 
The Multiple Vocations of the Interviewer
In addition to the enlightenment they were meant to of er the believer, the 
meetings generated by these research projects were to have an edifying ef ect 
on the interviewer, who was scientist, educator, and transcriber all rolled into 
one. In all the interviews we i nd what Yurchak calls “performative dimen-
69. RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 133, l. 106.
70. Andrianov, Lopatkin, and Pavliuk, Osobennosti sovremennogo religioznogo 
sozna niia, 42.
71. A. A. Avetis΄ian, Kritika sovremennoi religioznoi sotsial΄noi i losoi i: Ocherki po 
istorii religii i ateizma (Kiev, 1964).
72. M. M. Sheinman, Khristianskii sotsializm: Istoriia i ideologiia (Moscow, 1969).
73. L. Druianov and P. Kurochkin, “Pravoslavie glazami uchenykh,” Nauka i religiia, 
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sions,” which he sees “reproducing” certain social relations.74 Given that the 
interviewer had both the pen and paper (and thus the means to decide what 
had or had not been said) and the question list (the power to direct conversa-
tion), he was clearly in a privileged position, reproducing certain hierarchies: 
atheism over religion, science over tradition, and, usually, youth over age. In 
these years, young people were expected to take an active role in various proj-
ects aimed at the collective good; many, even with the detachment of post-
Soviet hindsight, still remember the enthusiasm they felt for the voluntary 
work carried out as students.75 By taking part in the project, the interviewers 
communicated their credentials as socially engaged young atheist Soviet citi-
zens. Some appear moved by what they heard, others disappointed that they 
could not convert their interviewee to atheism. Yet, on occasion, it seems that 
instead of simply reinforcing an easy correspondence between atheism, sci-
ence, and progress in opposition to the dark world of superstitious belief, the 
experience of conducting the interview in fact opened up new horizons.
We begin with a rather unusual interview. Perhaps it was his evident en-
thusiasm for the project which won V. I. Pronin, a student from the Ivanovo 
University of Marxism-Leninism, a meeting with a rather exotic kind of be-
liever: a Baptist prisoner. Pronin wrote up his report under the title “Self-
Analysis of a Believer in God.” Clearly disappointed that their meeting had 
not proved more ef ective, he explained: “Using a method of self-analysis in 
my conversations with Z[inov év], I tried to help him understand his religious 
views [razobrat śia v ego religioznykh vozzreniiakh] and to recognize the inl u-
ence of contemporary conditions on his consciousness. However, he turned 
out to be a zealous Baptist [revnostnyi Baptist].”76 In keeping with the inter-
est in psychology demonstrated at the Institute of Scientii c Atheism, Pronin 
spoke of the believer’s “consciousness,” on which he hoped to act: as a result 
of the thought processes the interview would encourage, the believer would be 
transformed into a modern, atheist citizen. Del ated, this student-interviewer 
noted, however, that the believer resolutely continued to believe in God, “just 
like before.”77
Pronin’s report on the interview is a lengthy and detailed account. At er 
setting out the Baptist’s history (a young Ukrainian, he had been sentenced 
for refusing to bear arms or swear the military oath) and his own approach to 
the interview, Pronin narrates the dif erent exchanges between the two men. 
One of his opening gambits, for example, was to “dispute the existence of 
God’s paradise” using scientii c discoveries to make his case, to which the be-
liever countered that only through God’s eyes can one see heavenly paradise. 
In another, Pronin introduced the USSR’s recent triumphs in space travel; 
Zinov év did not deny these successes but attributed them to God’s will, argu-
74. Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, 22.
75. See, for example, the oral history interview with Arkadii Darchenko in which he 
describes how, as students, he, his wife, and friends voluntarily participated in construc-
tion projects. Arkadii Olegovich Darchenko, “Our Entire Generation . . . Welcomed Pe-
restroika,” in Donald Raleigh, ed., Russia’s Sputnik Generation: Soviet Baby Boomers Talk 
about Their Lives (Bloomington, 2008), 141–42.
76. RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 133, l. 65.
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ing that, according to the Bible, the laws of nature are revealed to those who 
fear God, a position then challenged by Pronin, who noted that Soviet cosmo-
nauts, as atheists, are not afraid of God.78 The report continues in this vein: 
the interviewer’s own question or claim is followed by the believer’s response, 
the inadequacies of which are made clear to the reader. The encounter is thus 
presented as a contest between two entrenched positions, one clearly supe-
rior. Although disappointed that his mission to save the believer has failed, 
the student had no dii  culty in dealing epistemologically with the situation: 
in both the irrationality and stubbornness of his answers, the prisoner clearly 
matched what was to be expected of an active believer. In many respects, this 
interview is quite dif erent from the others examined here, not only because 
of the interviewee’s denomination, age, and gender, but also because he was 
serving time as a conscientious objector; he had evidently decided certain 
civic responsibilities were incompatible with his religious beliefs and was 
ready to endure prison rather than fuli l them.
Rather shorter transcripts were produced by Sokolov, a fourth-year stu-
dent medic who conducted interviews with at least two female pensioners 
from the city of Ivanovo. In writing up his reports, Sokolov chose to present 
the dialogue in the form of questions and answers, apparently verbatim. From 
the transcript, it appears that neither of the two exchanges lasted very long, 
although a couple of notes in parenthesis providing supplementary details 
suggest other, of -record exchanges, perhaps having taken place in earlier, 
unrecorded meetings. As presented, his believers appear relatively reticent, 
of ering only laconic answers to his questions. We have already met one of 
them, Likhacheva, who answered a question about God and communism 
with the claim that “God also wants us to live like that and wants people to 
live quietly, joyfully. And that’s why there will be communism—because God 
wants it.”79 Curiously, another of Sokolov’s interviewees responded with ex-
actly the same answer, word for word.80 How to explain the exact replication 
between two transcripts? Perhaps both women had said something similar, 
surmising (wrongly) that an equation between God and communism was the 
required answer. Perhaps Sokolov had typed up his notes in haste, inadver-
tently copying the wrong section or inventing sections that were missing. We 
cannot know. Yet, following insights from Yurchak’s work, we should not as-
sume that Sokolov was cynically acting out a part when he turned up on his 
interviewees’ doorsteps, even if he did not pay as much attention to his elderly 
informants’ observations as other students did. In Yurchak’s terms, he had 
“reproduced” himself as a “normal Soviet person.”81
Nothing in either of these two sets of interviews suggests that the didac-
tic, or missionary, impulse was successful. Sokolov, perhaps, had no expecta-
tion that it would be; Pronin was sorely disappointed with his failure. In both 
78. Ibid., l. 66. On the connections between atheist work and space travel, see Victoria 
Smolkin-Rothrock, “Cosmic Enlightenment: Scientii c Atheism and the Soviet Conquest of 
Space,” in James T. Andrews and Asif A. Siddiqi, eds., Into the Cosmos: Space Exploration 
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80. Ibid., l. 115.
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cases, though, the performative dimension was in play: the unequal rela-
tionship between interviewer and interviewee—the educated atheist and the 
backward believer—was reproduced. In the three interviews explored below, 
however, the binary of atheist and believer starts to crumble, and unexpected 
moments of intimacy break into the text.
Let us return to the story of Ol ǵa Kuznetsova. Conducted by a second-year 
student in the Department of Scientii c Atheism at the Ivanovo University of 
Marxism-Leninism, it i nishes with a surprising revelation: “I chose my own 
mother as the object of my chat [Ob΄́ektom dlia besedy ia izbrala svoiu mat΄]. 
I knew that my mum [mama] believes in God but had never spoken with her 
about religious matters. When I began the discussion about God and her faith, 
she responded enthusiastically.”82 Speaking of her mama as the object of her 
research, this student blended impersonal, academic language with more af-
fectionate terms. Choosing her own mother as interview material might ini-
tially seem to be evidence of a rather perfunctory approach to the assignment, 
but given the content of the conversation, it was hardly the “safe” option. In 
March 1964, with Khrushchev still in power, discussion of the terror and one’s 
own fate was possible but still daring. This is evident from the typed manu-
script: in a paragraph on terror, the word unjustly is written by hand, as if 
something else below had been erased or a tentative blank let  in a i rst drat . 
Aware that the conversation, although conducted within the family home, 
was meant for an external audience, the daughter-student had perhaps been 
wary of how to present her troubled family history. To an extent, the domestic 
nature of this beseda i ts more closely with Chizhova’s i ctional account, in 
which discussions of faith, and indeed political persecution, take place only 
within the context of the family home. Yet in this household, scarred by the 
terror, religious faith had long been of  limits, and it was only as a result of 
a research project conducted by an external body that it turned into a legiti-
mate topic of family conversation, an opportunity the devout mother seem-
ingly welcomed.
Another interview brought together two men in their 30s, both of whom 
had completed technical school. Gennadii Shevtsov (the believer) had a tech-
nical job in construction; Beliaev (the interviewer) identii ed himself as being 
a “nonparty” man who was taking a course in the Department of Scientii c 
Atheism at the Ivanovo University of Marxism-Leninism.83 The transcript de-
tails the beliefs held by Shevtsov, including the notion that God is everywhere 
and created the world; that God answers prayers that ask for help and sup-
port but not ones that try to inl ict misfortune on others; and that there is no 
at erlife. He said that he did not attend church and did not enter into discus-
sions about his religious beliefs because he realized it was inappropriate for a 
person of his age and educational level to do so. At the end of the three-page 
report, at er summarizing the man’s key religious views, the text ends rather 
abruptly: “No one in his family knows about his faith.” Given that he had 
become the subject of “individual work,” his faith cannot have been entirely 
secret, but this young man, normally too self-conscious to admit to his beliefs, 
82. RGASPI, f. 606, op. 4, d. 133, ll. 85–87.
83. Ibid., ll. 77–79.
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had, it seems, spent several hours sharing his ideas about God and the cre-
ation of life, divine punishment and intervention, prayer, and the existence 
or nonexistence of an at erlife.84 The sudden ending to the transcript suggests 
the interviewer was himself struck by the signii cance of the revelation.
For both Kuznetsova (the mother) and Shevtsov, the interview provided 
them with the opportunity to speak about beliefs that normally were of -
limits. Rather than convincing them that their views were erroneous and 
outdated, the experience was, as the transcripts suggest, almost cathartic. 
Both interviewers also found the process moving. Instead of preserving an 
entirely neutral position, they commented on passages they found af ective. 
Neither presented their reports as verbatim transcripts but instead directed 
their imagined reader (the academic researcher) to responses they considered 
“interesting.”85
Finally, we revisit the very i rst interview analyzed in this article: the 
encounter with Anastasia Alekseeva. Here the interviewer took a radically 
dif erent approach to the task of writing up the report. Instead of presenting 
the dialogue verbatim (as Sokolov had done) or summarizing the exchanges 
(the path others selected), the student, Volkov, wrote in the i rst-person, as if 
he had become his interviewee: “I imagine God as the human savior”; “I know 
about there being three Gods [o tom, chto bogov (sic) tri znaiu]”; and so on.86 In 
the text, the interviewer’s participation is entirely erased, only the numbers 
in the margin indicating that Alekseeva was responding to specii c questions 
or prompts and the prose too smooth and l uent to be a verbatim transcript of 
the actual exchange. Through Volkov’s act of ventriloquism, Alekseeva tells 
a life story that incorporates both values encouraged by the Soviet regime 
(anti clericalism, defense of the poor, anger about social injustice) and ones 
that were antithetical to Soviet atheist culture (contemplation of the Bible, 
belief in God as creator of the world, regular prayer). Between the two authors 
of the text—Alekseeva and Volkov—an identity was constructed that was nei-
ther that of a conservative, or duped, believer nor that of a progressive, atheist 
Soviet citizen.
The interviews thus had the potential to spark unexpected moments of in-
timacy between atheist and believer. The reports written by Kuznetsova (the 
daughter) and Beliaev suggest they responded emotionally to the encounter: 
a quiet pride that her mother had survived such ordeals, even if it required 
a private faith; a sense of shock that his informant was speaking of beliefs 
that mattered deeply but of which his family knew nothing. In both cases, 
the research project generated conversations that would not otherwise have 
taken place. In the Kuznetsov household, it produced a dialogue about faith 
and family suf ering which both parties appreciated; for Shevtsov, it allowed 
a conversation about his beliefs which social pressures normally precluded. 
84. Ibid., l. 79.
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In the i nal case, we have a transcript in which the atheist student became the 
believer, at least temporarily. Through the act of interviewing and writing up 
the interview, Volkov produced a text in which he imagined what it would be 
like to be a believer—and one who cherished many of the ideals and values 
on which the Soviet project was based. In these three cases, at least, the no-
tion of the believer was surely complicated by these unusual encounters, the 
binary between Soviet modern man and his backward “other” corroded, not 
reinforced, by the atheist work taking place.
These interviews, and the idiosyncratic texts they produced for the ar-
chive, are in part a rel ection of the political and intellectual climate of the 
1960s. Excited by the new opportunities available at er Stalin’s death, some 
scholars prioritized developing new theoretical and methodological ap-
proaches to understanding religiosity and belief, but many also subscribed to 
the idea that their work was additionally, perhaps primarily, about transform-
ing the believer herself.87 Although their i ndings did not always meet the 
party’s expectations, the researchers’ work supported one of the party-state’s 
most persistent goals: nurturing atheist dispositions throughout Soviet soci-
ety.88 In some respects, this was typical of a convergence of interests between 
certain sectors of the intelligentsia and the party leadership which occurred 
in the 1960s.89
The projects had multiple purposes. Both participants in the interviews 
were involved in a ritual that enacted the superiority of Soviet values (rea-
son, rationality, and enlightenment), but because the initiative was also about 
seeking and recording knowledge, the content of the performance was let  
open-ended. This made the interviews rather dif erent from the “rituals and 
speech acts” described by Yurchak, which were i xed and normative, even 
87. Klibanov’s i rst expedition to Tambov, in 1959, it was later noted, was primarily 
academic in nature, but it was defended on the grounds that the i ndings would help local 
propagandists improve their work. See N. P. Krasnikov, “O nekotorykh voprosakh raboty 
s veruiushchimi,” in N. P. Krasnikov, ed., Voprosy preodoleniia religioznykh perezhitkov 
v SSSR (Moscow, 1966), 5. Other scholars were keen to stress that their projects involved 
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noting that a number of visits took place over a period of one to two months and that many 
of these relationships continued long at er the end of the project. Tepliakov, “Materialy k 
issledovaniiu,” 145.
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if they went on to produce “diverse, multiple, and unpredictable meanings 
in everyday life.”90 In the examples studied here, the ideological work itself 
had become creative and unpredictable. As I suggest, we can attribute this in 
part to the political, cultural, and academic l ux of the sixties, but it was also 
characteristic of the Soviet atheist project more broadly.
In the postrevolutionary period, the closure of places of worship and the 
dismantling of church hierarchies brought about a partial domestication of 
religion. Of course, this process was not universal, and church attendance 
never entirely stamped out, but the restrictions on religious life in midcen-
tury Russia meant that many individuals were let  to their own devices as 
they worked toward their own interpretations of the Bible, elaborating their 
own beliefs about what would happen at er death. According to Wigzell, in 
these circumstances it was “a natural imaginative response” to envisage the 
world beyond the grave as more like their own.91 As we have seen here, this 
meant that Soviet values and experiences af ected ideas about who could en-
ter heaven and what paradise would look like. Among those who were poor 
and whose lives were sometimes lonely, these included potentially heretical 
rel ections on the still elusive nature of social justice in “this world.” One of 
the unintended consequences of Soviet antireligious policies, therefore, was 
to encourage “imaginative responses” rather than a straightforward loss of 
religious sentiment.92
As well as raising questions about the unequal nature of Soviet society, 
this recomposition of religious belief—to use Taylor’s terms—was potentially 
destabilizing because the containment and conquest of religion was so cen-
tral to the regime’s assertion of legitimacy. But it also helped create a role 
for social scientists whose job was to both narrate and implement the coun-
try’s uneven progress toward universal atheism. In the i nal decades of So-
viet power, their involvement of ered a new brand of atheist work. It again 
had unintended consequences. It is sometimes asserted that God became a 
taboo topic in the Soviet regime, but the besedy described here suggest that 
antireligious initiatives could encourage, rather than stil e, discussion.93 In 
the case of the Kuznetsov household, the task set by the atheist establish-
ment opened up an unprecedented dialogue between mother and daughter 
about the role of religious faith in their lives and its relationship to the terror. 
Elsewhere, it brought strangers together to talk about these intimate matters: 
a student medic interviews a pensioner; a math teacher visits a kolkhoznik.94 
Conventions dictated that relations between the two participants were imbal-
anced—as noted above, the performance was meant to reai  rm the superior-
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ity of Soviet values—but at times a connection between the two partners is 
palpable in the surviving transcripts.
Revived under Khrushchev, and reconi gured by the growing inl u-
ence of social scientists in the 1960s, the atheist agenda generated a set of 
performances and texts that allow the researcher insight into the religious 
imagination of a social cohort ot en excluded from historical accounts. Their 
marginalization does not make the believer the antithesis of the Soviet citi-
zen, however. Indeed, the life stories they told and the beliefs they articu-
lated show the impossibility of establishing a stark binary—even an imagined 
one—between believers and the rest of the Soviet community, however much 
such a distinction would have helped prove the rational and progressive na-
ture of socialist modernity.
